There are even philosophic arguments that consciousness is an illusion and even that the "self" is an illusion. What is the self? Rene Descartes famously wrote: "I think, therefore I am". He saw his self as a constant, the essence of his being, on which his knowledge of everything else was built. A century later, David Hume argued that there was no "simple and continued" self, just the flow of experience. Hume's proposal resonates with the Buddhist concept of anatta, or non-self, which contends that the idea of an unchanging self is an illusion and also at the root of much of our unhappiness.
A Introduction
i) Today, a growing number of philosophers and psychologists argue that the self is an illusion. But even if the centuries-old idea of it as essential and unchanging is misleading, there is still much to explain, for example: how you distinguish your body from the rest of the world; why you experience the world from a specific perspective, typically somewhere in the middle of your head; how you remember yourself in the past or imagine yourself in the future; and how you are able to conceive of the world from another's point of view? It seems science is close to answering these questions - more information here
Anyway, the nature of free will is a philosophical debate as old as philosophy itself so it's not going to be resolved any time soon, although there is very new evidence from neuroscience which does support the idea that free will is an illusion.
ii) Perhaps the biggest problem with free will is defining it. When we say "I made a choice"... what exactly is "I"? Do we control our brain, or does our brain control us, or is "my brain" and "I" equivalent? Does it make sense to imagine there's a "me" which is separate to my brain? And how do we define free will? For now, let's use dictionary definitions from the OED and Merriam Webster:
the power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one's own discretion.
the ability to choose how to act
the ability to make choices that are not controlled by fate or God
freedom of humans to make choices that are not determined by prior causes or by divine interventioniii) Explanations from Philosophy, Science and Psychology
Perhaps the closest explanation of free will that relates to my point of view is that proposed by Daniel Dennett on page 295 of his book "Brainstorm: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology"
"The model of decision making I am proposing has the following feature: when we are faced with an important decision, a consideration-generator whose output is to some degree undetermined produces a series of considerations, some of which may of course be immediately rejected as irrelevant by the agent (consciously or unconsciously). Those considerations that are selected by the agent as having a more than negligible bearing on the decision then figure in a reasoning process, and if the agent is in the main reasonable, those considerations ultimately serve as predictors and explicators of the agent's final decision."
However, where I tend to disagree with Dennett is with regard to the role of the "conscious awareness." Sam Harris makes the point that we don’t have conscious access to the processes that are the basis of our choices. Dennett says these processes are as much "us" as our conscious awareness. Sam Harris argues that the conscious self is the real self (and that makes sense to me). We consist (among other things) of neural processes but only some of these support consciousness. We deliberate and choose and act, but the "we" is processes in the brain which we are not in charge of. The feeling that we are in charge is, of course, very real.
iv) And speaking of Sam Harris, I tend to be persuaded by his argument (on page 65 of his book "Free Will") that the question of free will itself is a non-question - that the illusion of free will is an illusion!
"It is generally argued that our experience of free will presents a compelling mystery: On the one hand, we can’t make sense of it in scientific terms; on the other, we feel that we are the authors of our own thoughts and actions. However, I think that this mystery is itself a symptom of our confusion. It is not that free will is simply an illusion—our experience is not merely delivering a distorted view of reality. Rather, we are mistaken about our experience. Not only are we not as free as we think we are—we do not feel as free as we think we do. Our sense of our own freedom results from our not paying close attention to what it is like to be us. The moment we pay attention, it is possible to see that free will is nowhere to be found, and our experience is perfectly compatible with this truth. Thoughts and intentions simply arise in the mind. What else could they do? The truth about us is stranger than many suppose: The illusion of free will is itself an illusion."v) Galen Strawson provides a neat philosophical argument:
1 You do what you do, in any given situation, because of the way you are.
2 To be ultimately responsible for what you do, you have to be ultimately responsible for the way you are — at least in certain crucial mental respects.
3 But you cannot be ultimately responsible for the way you are in any respect at all.
4 So you cannot be ultimately responsible for what you do
vi) And of course, we have Schopenhauer's opinion that free will is a sort of determinism with illusionary freedom, which he summarised beautifully I think...
"We can do as we will, but we cannot will as we will"B Explanations from Neuroscience
i) But in terms of evidence, and I mean in the sense of evidence as measurable, empirical fact... we can turn to neuroscience. Experiments by physiologist Benjamin Libet show that activity in the brain’s motor cortex can be detected up to 300 milliseconds before a person feels that he or she has decided to move. fMRI tests highlight two brain regions which contain information about a person's decision 7 to 10 seconds before the decision was consciously made. Direct recordings from the cortex show that the activity of merely 256 neurones was sufficient to predict with 80% accuracy a person’s decision to move nearly one second before he became aware of it. So - moments before you are aware of what you will do next, your brain has already determined what you will do. You then become conscious of this “decision” and believe that you are in the process of making it. And that's the illusion.
ii) Professor Patrick Haggard is of the view that the illusion of free will is a result of the complexity that the brain deals with...
"We don't have free will, in the spiritual sense. What you're seeing is the last output stage of a machine. There are lots of things that happen before this stage – plans, goals, learning – and those are the reasons we do more interesting things than just waggle fingers. But there's no ghost in the machine. An amoeba has one input, one output. We are not one output-one input beings; we have to cope with a messy world of inputs, an enormous range of outputs. I think the term 'free will' refers to the complexity of that arrangement."
"To date, the field has been dominated by the ‘‘Libet experiment’’ [see Bi above] in which participants are asked to make a simple voluntary action, such as a key press, whenever they feel like it. Brain activity is measured throughout, originally using EEG and more recently using fMRI (Lau et al., 2004) and this hotly debated marker of volition is referred to as W (judgment of will, following Libet’s terminology). EEG activity over frontal motor areas began 1s or more before movement (the so-called "readiness potential") while W occurred much later, a few hundred millisecond before movement itself."
"The current work is in broad agreement with a general trend in neuroscience of volition: although we may experience that our conscious decisions and thoughts cause our actions, these experiences are in fact based on readouts of brain activity in a network of brain areas that control voluntary action... It is clearly wrong to think of [feeling of willing something] as a prior intention, located at the very earliest moment of decision in an extended action chain. Rather, W seems to mark an intention-in-action, quite closely linked to action execution."
iii) A study by Masao Matsuhashi and Mark Hallett, published in 2008, claims to have replicated Libet's findings without relying on the subjective reactions of the participants. They explain how their method can identify the time (T) at which a subject becomes aware of his own movement. This time not only varies, but often occurs after early phases of movement genesis have already begun (as measured by the readiness potential). They conclude that a person's awareness cannot be the cause of movement, and may instead only notice the movement.
iv) Neuroscience is the newest and fastest growing area of science, especially since the availability of fMRI technology. Data continues to be gathered to support the case that conscious "will" can be predicted from brain activity. fMRI machine learning of brain activity (multivariate pattern analysis) has been used to predict the user choice of a button (left/right) up to 7 seconds before their reported will of having done so. This study reported a statistically significant 60% accuracy rate, which may be limited by experimental setup; machine learning data limitations (time spent in fMRI) and instrument precision.
v) This article in Scientific American provides a good summary of the latest research.
We see the apparent motion of a dot before seeing that dot reach its destination, and we feel phantom touches moving up our arm before feeling an actual touch further up our arm. “Postdictive” illusions of this sort are typically explained by noting that there’s a delay in the time it takes information out in the world to reach conscious awareness: Because it lags slightly behind reality, consciousness can “anticipate” future events that haven’t yet entered awareness, but have been encoded subconsciously, allowing for an illusion in which the experienced future alters the experienced past.
Yet, whether or not there are advantages to believing we’re more in control of our lives than we actually are, it’s clear that the illusion can go too far. While a quarter-of-a-second distortion in time experience may be no big deal, distortions at longer delays—which might plague people with mental illnesses like schizophrenia and bipolar disorder—could substantially and harmfully warp people’s fundamental views about the world. People with such illnesses may begin to believe that they can control the weather or that they have an uncanny ability to predict other people’s behavior. In extreme cases, they may even conclude that they have god-like powers.
vi) Libet's experiments described in (i) suggested that the subconscious appeared to be initiating a decision to move about 300 milliseconds before people were aware they'd decided. Then as described in (iv), it was discovered in 2008 that unconscious brain activity starts to ramp up even earlier, preceding a decision to move by up to 7 seconds. A key question is whether this unconscious brain activity be interrupted - can we consciously override the process? The results of experiments were published in 2016 in the journal PNAS which reveal there is a "point of no return" which is 200 milliseconds before movement. So... we become aware of a decision to take action after the decision is made, and the brain continues to process that decision until the movement is made and can make a different decision, depending on the information it receives. This ability to "change our minds" is part of the illusion of free will. Our minds change every second, information is processed continuously, and a decision can be superseded by another decision. We may feel we are consciously controlling that process but we are not, we are simply becoming aware of it, and slightly behind time. And any new decision by the brain to "veto" an action can only take place up to 200ms before the action, at which point the action is inevitable.
One of the researchers, John Dylan-Haynes, explains that there is no room for true free will in the brain. Just like the heart or the liver, the brain is subject to natural laws.
Frequently Asked Questions
It can be seen from the questions below that Apologists will automatically assume that anyone who claims free will might be an illusion is a "determinist". This is not true. Every human being has an intuitive concept of free will i.e. "something" inside us that allows us to make "real" choices and in a non-predeterminism religious context, that includes choices that even God could not predict. If determinism was true it would of course rule out that sort of free will, but the point is that indeterminism also doesn't support the idea of free will. An event which is not strictly determined by prior physical data could be indeterminately, probabilistically, or "randomly" caused by prior physical data.
So for example, if you chose toast instead of waffles for breakfast, and the universe was rewound to the big bang, hard determinism says that exactly the same universe, atom for atom, would result and you'd choose toast again. My view is that this is not true - a different universe would result because of the randomness that exists at a quantum level. If it was possible to recreate the exact conditions of a given choice you will face the same probabilities for that choice, which leaves room not for free will, but for the potential of a different choice.)
(My views on determinism are covered here).
A good way to explore the nature of free will in the context of Christian theology is through specific questions and examples with Christians, and here are some of the questions regarding free will that have come up on a particular religion discussion board...
1 If I go into a store I am tempted to buy that big screen TV when I go to get a flash drive, but I choose not to for a variety of reasons. My intuitive impulse is to get the TV but I restrain from doing it. Surely if I can make a choice, then I have free will?
1a Choosing not to do something is not a choice. Free will is about what you do - the actions you take - not what you don't do. There are a trillion actions you could take, every minute of every day, but these are irrelevant. The point here is - why did you not buy the TV. You considered it but there were constraints that resulted in your brain moving from that thought to the next one. What's important is what you actually did - you bought a flash drive because you needed it. Your choice was not free.
2 Imagine a rickety bridge, and when someone assesses the risk of crossing it, they have two choices: To cross, or not to cross, and each of those choices is freely made.
2a We need to focus on the action that was taken and then how that choice was made. The brain assesses the risk of crossing, given the evidence available, and the outcome of that assessment determines the subsequent action. Not crossing the bridge is not an action. Walking the other way is an action. Or swimming across the river. Or whatever. Your brain's assessment of the risk determined your action. Hence this is another illustration that free will is an illusion. The choice was not freely made, it was constrained. No one in their right mind would cross a bridge which they felt carried an obvious risk of death.
3 I started out liking football because watching games was something my father and I enjoyed doing together. I choose teams to root for based on a variety of reason, but I make that decision. Of course, if I grew up in England I would unlikely not care about American football for lack of exposure.
4 Surely one could choose whether or not to be a fan of football in spite of one's parenting, peers, culture and geography? Perhaps we like a sport and grow tired of it.
4a One doesn't choose to be a fan of something - being a fan is an attachment arising from an emotional reaction, it's a belief. There are indeed many reasons which influence why someone would become a fan of something, say football. But the existence of such reasons and influences and emotional constraints, can be used to illustrate that free will is an illusion.
5 You probably have the option - right now - of dipping your head in a bucket of acid or some other toxic substance. Would you choose to do so? Of course not! Does the fact that you choose not to do so mean that you don't have free will?
5a This example can be used to neatly demonstrate why free will can be considered to be an illusion. In fact there are no buckets of acid or toxic substances available to me, so dipping my head in one is not an option, but I think I know what the questioner means!
5b Note that the question is about not making a choice. Free will should be about the choices we do make (See #1 above).
5c The second point is that people could deliberately and consciously harm themselves physically at any time, but they very rarely do. More importantly - we rarely even think of harming ourselves, and if we do, such thoughts are tested by our brains to determine the possible outcomes, and if we are of sound mind, they are not turned into action. People who do harm themselves are generally considered to be of unsound mind and not responsible for their actions, and hence have not acted from free will.
5d People of unsound mind who harm themselves can be treated by means of therapy or drugs, or maybe just by talking to other people, or by reading, or watching a TV programme, or in extreme cases neuro-surgery. Or more likely, a combination of these. They are all different ways of "re-programming" the brain, which demonstrates that what we consider to be actions resulting from free will are a result of how our brains are "programmed".
6 Is it true to say that any choice unimpeded by physical, social, or mental constraints is an exercise of free will?
6a No, because every choice is "impeded by physical, social or mental constraints"! That is the point. Our thoughts and actions are determined entirely by biology, genetic and social conditioning. In other words they are based on all the inputs to which our brains have ever been exposed - and the key point is we have no control over those inputs. Hence no free will in taking the decisions we did. We have no choice of when or where or to whom we are born. No choice in the neighbours and family we were exposed to. No choice of teachers. And so on.
6b So, our decisions are based entirely on the inputs received by the brain, and the nature of the brain. Furthermore, when those decisions are made, we are not aware of them until after they are made. It feels as if we have some kind of control over and above what the brain is calculating, as if we are checking the output of a computer before we use it. But actually we are reading that output after it's been used. That's the illusion. Then there's the problem with "we" - who or where is the "we" who is checking what the brain is doing?
7 THE OVERRIDING BRAIN
This blue section includes a set of questions which are all based on the same assumption, namely that free will is defined as an ability to consciously "override" our instincts, or our "automatic pilot". This is an unusual definition of free will. My argument is that although we naturally feel we are "overriding" our thoughts, that is an illusion, central to the illusion of free will, because we are simply becoming consciously aware of what appears to be an "override" - the "override" has happened before we are aware of it.
7.1 There are always physical, social and mental constraints on our actions, but we can override them and in spite of them, make difficult, counterintuitive choices.
7.1a The choices we make are influenced by the constraints that we can't "override" or to be precise - the thoughts that our brains test and reject as actions. Part of the problem in the question is the separation of "we" and "brain". Consider "we" to be the brain. If free will is an illusion, that doesn't mean our brain always takes the easiest action.
7.1b The idea of a "counter-intuitive choice" presumably describes a choice we made that we didn't expect to make before we thought about it. But when my brain thought about it, it eventually made a choice that I considered to be the right choice. My "intuition" and/or instincts were just part of the inputs into the decision making process.
7.2 How does the fact that we make a conscious decision slightly before we are aware of the processes involved make the free will decision itself an illusion?
7.2a The question is based on a false assumption - we do not make conscious decisions. Our brains make decisions which we become conscious of. Furthermore, anyone who is not a neuroscientist will be unaware of the "processes involved."
7.2b Evidence shows that decisions are made before we are conscious of them. The decisions become what we feel to be conscious decisions after they are made. When we become conscious of them, it feels to us that we have come to a “conscious conclusion”. That's the illusion. Free will is an illusion precisely because we don't make conscious decisions. The decision is made before you are conscious of it.
7.3 Are we are capable of overriding influences and making a counterintuitive decision if we choose to do so?
7.3a If there is any "overriding" in the thought processes, it is the brain that is doing it as part of the decision making process. Again, the fundamental problem in the question is the meaning of "we" as if "we" are a different entity to the brain. Our brains make decisions before we are consciously aware that the decision has been made. It doesn't matter if we would classify the decision as "counter-intuitive" before we thought about it - as far as our brain is concerned it has made the correct decision. And there is no such thing as a "counter intuitive" decision within our brains. Decisions by one's brain may seem counter intuitive to someone else, but not to us.
7.4 Is there a gap between our decision-making and the time it takes for us to be able to analyze, define and express the decision in words? It does take time for the mind to describe the decision that has been made - but that in no way means that the initial decision wasn't made with free will!
7.4a The question does not represent the chain of events in the brain. There is a gap between your brain making a decision and your being consciously aware of the decision. But the analysis was part of the decision making process and took place before you were consciously aware of the decision. Once you became consciously aware, you were able to express the decision in words. So there's three steps being described here... The decision; your awareness of it; then your ability to analyse and/or describe the decision.
7.5 The delay between my brain making a decision and my awareness of the decision does not warrant a conclusion that I have no control over those processes.
7.5a The problem here is the equivocation of "I" and "my brain". You are your brain and your brain is you. Your brain controls the decision making processes just as it controls all of the processes in your body.
7.6 There are drives in our brains based on instinct, nature, nurture and/or any other factors that would impede my making "logical" or "moral" decision. I can override those factors and make a counterintuitive decision.
7.6a It is true that our brains operate according to our nature (including instincts), and our nurture (experiences, parenting teaching, conversations, knowledge, information, discovery etc.) But these factors do not impede your logical or moral decision making processes - they provide the information which is the input for those processes. You can't consciously "override" those factors - your brain uses those factors during the decision making process to make a decision which you feel is right. If subsequent new information leads you to feeling that the decision your brain made was wrong, your brain will try to solve that problem based on the new information and may come up with a different decision. Or it may confirm its original decision.
7.6.1 We can influence through our teaching by word and/or example but the person we are trying to influence still has free will as to how they choose to respond to such.
That’s just an assertion. We know that people respond to teaching in different ways, but we don't know they have free will. Teaching is
one way of reprogramming someone else’s brain. For example, good
"moral" choices can be "programmed" into an individual
because we see this happening every day. Why would you even try to teach a
child right from wrong or try to influence them at all, if such a thing was not
possible? Obviously, that programming doesn’t always happen the way the “teacher”
would like, depending on the nature of the listener.
7.7.1 You arguing that our brains are passively programmed without any deliberate input on our part. 7.7.1a We can consider that the brain is programmed, but it's hardly passive. Its biological, chemical and physical structure changes all the time, the "programming" resulting from new information and it is updated every second of every day, 24/7, and the flood of thoughts never stops. "Deliberate input" occurs if the brain perceives a problem or need to solve that requires new knowledge, and it will seek that new input and will cause you to take the required actions to get that input, if possible.
7.7.2 It doesn't matter when we become aware of the "conscious" part of our input when we make a deliberate, aware effort to consider the matter before us.
7.7.2a There is no "conscious part of our input" - consciousness makes us aware of what's happened (the outputs) - it doesn't provide input. We don't make "deliberate, aware efforts". The brain "considers matters" automatically.
7.7.3 Are you suggesting the mind operates on simplistic principles of linear causality?
7.7.3a Not at all! I would argue the human brain is the most complex structure in the known universe. Also, the brain does not operate in a linear way but rather with an incredibly complex, continuous stream of parallel processing that computer scientists can only dream about! Even for a routine function such as vision, the brain is simultaneously and seamlessly processing a massive range of incoming information, analysing colour; motion; shape and depth - comparing these to memories - combining all of that into a field of view that can be comprehended. However, none of that changes the evidence which suggests that our brains make decisions before we are consciously aware.
7.7.4 Libet's study argues for "linear causality" but now you say "linear causality" is not how the mind operates.
7.7.4a Libet's study makes no mention of causality, linear or otherwise. It simply provides evidence that we only become conscious of decisions after they are made; hence free will is an illusion. The processes leading up to that awareness are absolutely not linear, as described in 7.7.3.
7.8.1 Some decisions are more or less "automatic" that we make all the time which we never need to verbalise or analyze, for example, breathing, blinking or scratching an itch.
7.8.1a Mainly correct, except sometimes we do become conscious those actions if we perceive there is a problem with them. And these involuntary actions do nothing to support the existence of free will. A voluntary action is accompanied by the felt intention to carry it out, whereas an involuntary action isn’t
7.8.2 Deliberate, free will decisions can be, and are, made before we can consciously verbalize or even conceptualize them.
"Deliberate" means "consciously made" and evidence shows decisions are not consciously made. The actions of "verbalising" and "conceptualising" are subsequent actions (which may never happen) and are nothing to to with the brain making its decision.
7.9.1 Suppose you direct your focus to questioning whether a certain habit is still appropriate. You run several considerations and options through your mind. You will find yourself strongly influenced to make one choice or another by various ingrained imperatives that are indeed beyond your control, yet you can still choose to decide and act in the face of those influences and make a counterintuitive decision for a greater logical or moral purpose.
7.9.1a First of all, it is not you directing your focus, it is your brain doing this some new information has been received which requires the appropriateness of the habit to be assessed.
7.9.1b It is not "you" that runs the considerations and options through your mind. Your brain is doing that as part of the decision making process.
7.9.1c You will not find yourself strongly influenced by "ingrained imperatives." Those "ingrained imperatives" are just one set of inputs that the brain uses to come to a decision, including the new information that has been received. At this point you are not consciously aware of any decision.
7.9.1d You can't choose to decide and act in the face of those influences. Your brain is making a choice as part of the decision making process. At this point you are not consciously aware of any decision and no action has been determined.
7.9.1e If it's a difficult decision that takes significant time, you can become consciously aware of the thought processes as the brain considers a complex stream of "what-if" scenarios to come to a decision. This can sometimes be perceived as a conversation or inner dialog.
7.9.1f When your brain has made a decision, you become consciously aware of the decision. You may or may not consider this to be "counter-intuitive" - the decision may indeed surprise you. But you believe it to be the right decision
7.9.1.1 What happens in the brain when we consider a matter and weigh the pros and cons?
These are thought processes in the brain working to resolve problems,
thought processes which we have become aware of. There are also millions of
problems and thought processes that you are not aware of. It would be
impossible to live with such awareness.
7.9.2 We make choices that are uncomfortable at times because they appear to against our values and hence against our free will to choose to act otherwise.
7.9.2a Whatever the choice made by our brain, it is always perceived to be right by our brain, at the time. What you refer to as “values” are one of many inputs used by the brain to arrive at the answer to a problem. So the brain does not "go against" values - it uses them as one of many inputs.
7.9.3 In exercising "free will" we take on responsibility for our choice because in thinking the matter through, weighing our options, and making a decision that potentially may put us at inconvenience or even risk we are applying "values" to our decision making.
7.9.3a None of that demonstrates "exercising free will". Our brains "think the matter through" and "weigh our options" and the brain then makes a decision that we then become aware of, after it was made. It doesn't matter if that decision "puts us at inconvenience or risk", the brain perceives it to be the right decision, given the information available.
7.9.4 We may apply values that transcend concerns for our personal well-being and reference values from a religion.
7.9.4a Unless now is arguing for dualism, rather than "we" it's more accurate to say "our brains apply values..." and those values come from a mixture of nature and nurture, including religion. None of that demonstrates free will.
7.9.5 A "moral wrong" cannot exist apart from a free will choice.
7.9.5a This assertion is not supported by evidence. Morality is partly innate and partly learned (nature & nurture again!) When our brain makes a choice our moral emotions are part of the input. We became consciously aware of that choice after it's made.
7.10 A "free will decision" is a deliberate, counterintuitive choice that overrides any inherited biochemical instincts and imperatives
7.10a Every decision that your brain makes uses instincts and "imperatives" as part of its input, along with many other inputs. But that does not demonstrate the existence of free will.
7.10b For example, a young child has a very limited range of experiences and knowledge, and will rely on instinct and intuition because that's all it has. As we grow older, we gain more information which enables us to make more complex decisions.
7.10c This also explains why our ancient ancestors described the world by means of intuitive, instinctive, supernatural explanations. They didn't have the information that became available in the future - they were less informed.
7.11 Does the ability to make free will choices demonstrate that different people with different experiences, different nature and nurture, unique brains, and so forth, can make the SAME choices as other unique individuals?
7.11a No. First of all, the question assumes that free will is an ability, but this is open to question. Secondly, different people can make the same choices because different brains can still reach the same conclusions. And why shouldn't they? If there are say, 5 possible outcomes to a situation that requires a decision, and 100 people are in that situation, then some people are bound to make the same decision.
7.11b For example, we imagine having the option of choosing to walk off the edge of a cliff, but it is an option that would only very rarely be chosen. Our brain's decision making process includes a mechanism that ramps up or down the probabilistic element of our behaviour, depending on the situation at hand. This is something that evolved over millions of years as a survival strategy. Variability inherent in behaviour is a prerequisite for survival in a competitive environment. A predator should not be able to always guess its prey's actions, but the actions of the prey should not be so random as to include options even more dangerous to the prey than the danger from the predator.
7.12 We are capable of making independent decisions and enhancing or diminishing our preferences if we make a deliberate effort to do so.
7.12a This suggests there's a "you" separate to your brain, and this "you" is independently observing and analysing the brain's decisions and then making an "independent decision". That's the same as having two brains working in serial where free will is the illusion when you become conscious of what your second brain has decided.
7.12b Perhaps the "two brain" idea suggests a two stage process in the brain, but evidence shows multiple regions of the brain (far more than two) responsible for different types of decision making. For example, cognitive control and value-based decision making happens in different areas of the prefrontal cortex. Your brain is constantly analysing the real-time information it receives. Some of it is relevant to the problems it is trying to solve and some of it not. The cognitive control network maintains focus on what's important.
7.12c One way to determine which parts of the brain relate to different types of decision making is to study patients with brain lesions. This shows that damage to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) appears to profoundly affect cognitive control and that the dlPFC forms a network with the anterior cingulate cortex, which together keep focus on the problem at hand, switching it when appropriate to the task, and looking for erroneous choices in order to correct them. People with damage to the dlPFC have difficulty with keeping attention and are easily distracted when trying to make a decision.
7.13 A slight time lag in processing and defining the decision-making process does not alter the fact that we are using our "free will" ability to make deliberate, and occasionally counter-intuitive, "free will" decisions.
7.13a There is no time lag in "processing and defining the decision-making process" whatever that means! There is a time lag in a decision being made by the brain, and the conscious awareness of the decision that has already been made.
7.14 You view the brain as a passive receptor of stimuli with only a limited ability to make choices and respond.
7.14a Absolutely not! The brain is far from limited - it has a phenomenal ability to make choices and respond. "Stimuli" is not the best word - what the brain receives is information. And it also creates information. "Passive" is also not the best word. The brain is dynamic, constantly reflecting and processing information and creating new information, due to its primary purpose of extracting meaning.
7.15 We make unconscious, automatic-pilot decisions but we are also able to make "conscious" decisions involving free will in which we are capable of overriding the factors that would have led us to make an unconscious decision.
7.15a That's what it feels like, but there is no evidence to support the idea that we make "conscious decisions". Evidence shows that all decisions are made before we are aware of them. Once they are made, then we become conscious of them. If a thought was "overridden" by another thought, that also happened before we became conscious that it happened.
7.16 Is a decision made differently on different days only relevant to the "information" one has received? What of preferences or other deliberate considerations involved? In what way do you see this as negating free will?
7.16a A decision is made when your brain has solved a problem. You then become aware of that decision and it feels right. A few hours, days, weeks or years later, your brain may be required to solve the same problem. During that time your brain has changed. It has received more information, it has processed more information, it has created more information and it has physically changed. All of those factors make it possible for your brain to come to a different solution to the same problem at different times.
7.16b What are "preferences"? That's another word for beliefs, which are created by the brain, and they are one source of information which the brain uses when it solves a problem.
7.16c What are "deliberate considerations"? It's another term for the thought process. However, the word "deliberate" is not appropriate. Thoughts are not "deliberate" because "deliberate" means consciously made.
7.16d I don't see any of this as "negating free will". Rather, I don't see how any of this demonstrates that free will is not an illusion.
7.17 We can actually choose what to like, directly or indirectly. If we choose to value one response, and act on it by orienting ourselves towards it repeatedly, we influence our "likes" and "dislikes". We form "good" habits and "bad" habits. This is a matter of free will choice.
7.17a This is not a matter of choice or indeed, a matter of free will. A person does not choose to like something, a person likes something (or not). Habits are formed over time, they are usually not a choice, but if they were they are not a matter of free will. For example, I might want to develop a habit of eating porridge for breakfast. The decision to pursue that aim was made by my brain before I was consciously aware of it, perhaps in response to a perceived health problem. The plan to eat porridge every morning, and the actions to make it every morning, were also determined before I was consciously aware of them.
7.18.1 Our species came to predominate because of our ability to analyze objective data and reach a "rational" conclusion that OVERRIDES what instinct and other biological imperatives might have been thrust upon us!
7.18.1a I don't know if human beings "predominate" but we are certainly a very successful species. However, that's not because we reach "rational conclusions that override our instincts and "biological imperatives". The human brain is unique because we have developed a large forebrain as our cerebral cortex increased in size. (That's why the brain has the appearance of a walnut, because it has folds so that it fits in the skull).
7.18.1b Human beings have a larger cerebral cortex relative to the rest of the brain than any other animal and it's the cerebral cortex that provides our unique skills of language, knowledge sharing, imagination and problem solving. But that's nothing to do with free will.
7.18.2 The brain itself is able to override the impulses arising from "nature and nurture" in making deliberate choices - and this demonstrates free will
7.18.2a This does not demonstrate free will, because the "impulses" are just some of the information the brain uses to make its decision. It is wrong to use the phrase "deliberate choices" because evidence shows our choices are not deliberate - they are not consciously made. They are made by the brain before we are consciously aware they have been made.
7.18.3 How can we "Find a solution to the problem" if we are unfree to choose to do so apart from the constraints of impulses that we cannot override?
7.18.3a Our brains find solutions to problems constantly, all the time, 24/7. That's a key purpose of the brain. We don't choose to solve problems - it just solves them, automatically.
7.19 We have an ability to deliberately override biological imperatives that would seem to force our decision one way or another. The position you are arguing for is that we don't have that capacity since--per your perspective--we don't have ultimate free will.
7.19a The point is we don't deliberately "override biological imperatives" and we don't "force" our decisions. The ability referred to in the question does not exist. It seems like it, and that's part of the illusion of free will. Our brains use our "biological imperatives" as just one of many inputs to decision making. I don't know what "ultimate free will" means. What I'm saying is that we feel we have free will, but it's not what it seems. It's an illusion.
7.20.1 Free will is demonstrated by the amount of focus and consideration one puts into making a potential decision.
7.20.1a The point is that one puts no conscious "focus or consideration into making a potential decision." The brain makes decisions and then we become aware of them. Some very difficult decisions only come about after our brains have been thinking for hours or days, even when we are asleep. Even when we become conscious of a decision, the brain continues its processes and may provide us with a different decision later.
7.20.2 When we act without giving our actions a second thought we indeed allow "nature and nurture" to determine our actions.
7.20.2a The point here is that "second thoughts" occur when there is more information available than when the decision was made. And those "second thoughts" follow the same process as the "first thoughts"? It is our brains that determine our actions, and our brains are formed by nature and nurture.
7.20.3 How is one free to challenge, test, or assess the quality of information one receives if one has no free will to do so?
Change the word “free” to “able” and the question makes sense. Otherwise
it is just begging the question i.e. assuming a choice is “free” in order to argue
that a choice is free. So in other words, one is able to challenge, test, or assess the quality of information using one's brain. That's what the brain does.
7.21 When one applies focus and consideration, we exercise our ability to make free will, even counterintuitive, decisions
7.21a One does not consciously apply focus and consideration while the brain is making a decision. The concept of a "counterintuitive decision" is odd because our brains make decisions that are intuitive to us. The brain cannot provide a decision that feels wrong. (They may of course be counterintuitive to other people).
7.22 A slight lag time before one can verbalise a decision does not mean that a free will decision wasn't made.
7.22a Correct. It is the time lag before we become conscious of a decision that suggests free will is an illusion. However, this example contains not one decision but three...
7.22b Imagine being faced with the problem of what to have for breakfast. The brain provides a decision based on its nature and all of the information available to it. A split second later we become aware of that decision, say, a bowl of cornflakes.
7.22c Then imagine someone wants to know why we chose a bowl of cornflakes. This is a new problem for the brain to solve, and eventually it decides what the reasons were, or it may decide there was no reason and the choice was "random". (For example, think of a US President... then explain why you are thinking of that one in particular). In any case, we have yet another decision that was made before we were consciously aware of it.
7.22d The next step in the process it the action of "verbalising". This action is triggered by the brain, and again, we become consciously aware of the action after the trigger to carry out the action.
7.23.1 We have a family member who was very skilled at coming up with ingenious solutions to complex problems but had very poor communication skills and gets tongue-tied when trying to explain his ideas. Does this mean his decision-making involved no application of free will?
7.23.1a Communication skills are totally irrelevant to the question of free will. Your family member's communication skills had nothing to do with his brain's decision making process, and therefore tells us nothing about free will. The fact is that every time your family member's brain made a decision, he was not consciously aware of it until it was already made. Therefore free will is an illusion.
7.23.2 Were his decisions deterministic in that he "had" to do all the things he did?
7.23.2a The problem with this question is the word “had” which implies inevitability. For example, if I toss a coin it will inevitably come down as either head or tails – but it doesn't have to come down tails, and it doesn't have to come down heads. So only a believer in strict determinism would say "had to" when there are choices. All we know is that your family member's brain did make specific choices.
7.23.2b The factors which went into his brain's decision making were huge in number and massively complex - a vast range of information and experiences over many years combined with the nature of the brain itself and the state of the brain at any particular time, and potentially an element of randomness.
7.23.3 Is just another way of saying that he made no free will choices for himself?
7.23.3a The evidence shows that "free will choices" are an illusion. He became aware of the decisions his brain had made, after they had been made.
7.23.4 Were all of his choices were the result of random factors beyond his control?
7.23.4a "Random" is not the right word. It would be more accurate to say his choices were the result of factors which his brain used during its controlled decision making. And there may be an occasional element of randomness during the trillions of decisions a brain makes during its lifetime, because that is the nature of matter.
7.23.5 If "random" isn't the right word - what is?
7.23.5a A better word than "random" in this context is "complex". Also, the words "beyond his control" are redundant. His brain is in control. His brain is him. So the statement makes more sense if it says... "All of his choices were the result of complex processes in the brain."
7.24 Animals are also capable of making "free will" decisions. They tend to be more reliant on their instincts but can also choose to follow a goal or desire
7.24a Animal and insect brains are less sophisticated than human brains but still perform the same function but not to the same levels. Similarly consciousness and awareness exists in the animal world but only above a certain level of brain complexity. So, if free will is an illusion for human beings then it is also an illusion for other species.
7.24b Animals are more reliant on their instincts because they don't have the processing power, or the range of available information that human beings have. This does not demonstrate free will.
7.25 A trained dog will serve the will of its master and follow what they perceive to be a pack leader, but dogs can also turn on their "masters" and figure certain things out and reach "logical" decisions that override their instincts.
7.25b Research shows that animals do not necessarily react with the same response when they are given the same stimulus. Animal behaviour is just as unpredictable as human behaviour, but the responses come from a predictable list of options. The brain generates behaviours and options but these are not controlled by the conscious mind - in fact many animals and insects don't have a conscious mind. So free will is just as much an illusion for all species - not just human beings.
7.25c Because behaviour can be predicted within a range of options, it is wrong to assume behaviour is deterministic. A better word is stochastic - this describes behaviour that seems random (such as a dog turning on its master) but which actually follows a defined set of probabilities. A non-biological example of this is earthquakes which cannot be accurately predicted, but which follow a pattern over time.
7.26.1 Without free will, how is it possible for different people with different nature & nurture and unique brains to reach the same conclusions and make the same choices? Why do people reach the same conclusion in spite of the differences in their nature/nurture?
7.26.1a Why shouldn't they? Every situation has a fixed number of outcomes, so a group of people would be bound to agree on certain choices. Unique brains and different experiences whould mean it's very rare for two people to agree on everything all the time, and that's what we observe.
7.26.1b People have unique legs but they still arrive at the same place! Individual snowflakes and fingerprints, like brains, are unique, but they are also very similar. Just because two brains are unique doesn't mean they can't make he same choices.
7.26.2 But each person who came to a shared conclusion was a unique individual with unique nature/nurture yet they all agreed among themselves that a particular option was the best. They reached a "free will" decision.
7.26.2a A group of unique brains can of course come to the same conclusions, sometimes for the same reasons, sometimes for different reasons. For example, people vote Democrat (or whatever) in an election for a variety of reasons. However, this cannot be assumed to be a “free will decision” because a decision is made by the brain before we are consciously aware of it. Hence free will is an illusion.
7.26.2b A group of people have an advantage over a single person because multiple brains are involved (“two heads are better than one”.) If a group of people share their ideas, each brain is then receiving new inputs from other brains, and this could cause it to come up with a different choice, or affirm a choice already made.
7.27.1 Are you arguing against humankind's ability to arrive at rational decisions?
Absolutely not! I'm explaining how it works!
7.27.2 In this article, Tim Stratton explains (via JP Moreland) that according to a naturalistic worldview, free will does not exist. But if the atheist happens to be correct about naturalism, it seems that it is impossible for free will to exist, and it logically follows that rationality is lost as well, which means their conclusion that free will does not exist is irrational. Hence the argument that free will does not exist is self refuting.
2.27.2 The first problem in that statement is the idea that the free will argument has nothing to do with a naturalistic worldview - it is a conclusion arrived at rationally, using evidence and logic. I think a naturalistic argument could be used in favour of free will. The second problem is the idea that rationality requires free will, because that is demonstrably untrue. For example, a set of traffic lights make rational decisions all day long, but no one is claiming traffic lights have free will. A common argument made for the existence of free will is a person who makes irrational decisions, such as a smoker with a chronic cough who continues to smoke. The argument that free will is an illusion is an entirely rational argument.
7.28 Are you saying that our ability to solve problems and reach a decision is all determined randomly?
7.28a Absolutely not! Our brains provide the ability to solve problems, thereby making choices and reaching decisions. Those processes are not random. However, we cannot rule out occasional randomness in any biological or physical process, such is the nature of matter. That's another reason why groups of people tend to make better decisions than individuals.
7.29 Are you claiming that whenever two people agree it has nothing to do with the rationality of the choice(s) made, only random factors?
7.29a Absolutely not! When two people agree it's because both of their brains have reached the same decision. Whatever choice they made will seem rational to them (although it might not seem rational to some other people).
7.30 Are you saying that it is impossible to reach a decision based on a preference?
7.30a Absolutely not! Our nature and nurture result in each brain having a “preference” in many situations, sometimes a strong preference, sometimes a weak one, but also sometimes no preference. For example, a person who is religious by nature and/or nurture will have a brain that gives a preference to religious explanations.
7.31 So from your perspective, are you not freely arriving at any decisions to write whatever you write?
7.31a My brain is deciding what I should write, and I am becoming consciously aware of what to write after my brain has made that decision. The “free will” feeling that I have when writing, is an illusion
7.32 Are you claiming that your brain is influenced by everything under the sun BUT free will?
7.32a That is indeed what the evidence suggests!
7.33 You are suggesting that the brain makes decisions that bypass our ability to reflect, reason, and provide free will conclusions and decisions analyzing and considering such.
Absolutely not! The brain bypasses nothing. The brain has the ability to reflect, reason and make decisions, but the concept of “free will conclusions” is an assumption and could be an illusion. Conclusions? Yes. Free will conclusions? Maybe not!
7.34 Does the brain tell us what it’s decided and makes us aware?
Those are odd concepts. If the brain tells "you" something -
what exactly is it talking to? What is this "you" thing that you
refer to which is separate from the brain? Becoming aware of a decision (or
anything) is a state of mind. Perhaps this question is a reference to dualism?
The brain doesn’t “make us aware” – we simply become aware of certain
decisions. It’s an automatic process. (See also 7.12)
7.35 would you concede that I have the free will to choose to comply when I respond to your questions?
Again - consider your response and give your reasons for how you responded. Then you will see what I mean.7.35 would you concede that I have the free will to choose to comply when I respond to your questions?
Depends how you define free will.
Your brain (like any brain) processes information, solves problems, makes
decisions and triggers actions. So for the specific request you refer to, your
brain decided on the response you've provided, for a whole host of reasons.
To see what I mean, consider your response and give your reasons for how you
responded.
7.36 Our brain allows for us to make decisions, change
our minds, and act on our choices, whatever they may be. So
again: do I have control--through
personal choice--to comply with any request that you may give me?
The issue here is again: What is the difference between "us" and "our brain". What's the difference between "personal choice" and a choice made by the brain? I'm saying there is no difference - you are your brain, your brain is you and your brain makes the choices. To take it step by step...
"Our brain allows for us to make decisions"No: Our brain makes decisions. The brain is in control of the decision making process.
"change our minds" What we perceive as "changing our mind" is just a decision which supersedes a previous decision.
"act on our choices"Our brains cause us to act based on those decisions.
8 There are all sorts of options for us to act in all sorts of ways--from harmless to harmful to silly and/or bizarre. Why would you exclude such from "free will" just because they haven't occurred to you?
8a Options which could result in harmful, silly or bizarre actions occur to us as thoughts all the time, even when we are asleep, and these form the imagination, which is vitally important to us as a species. It means our brains can test millions of possible outcomes in a very short time before selecting an action. This process can be used as evidence to demonstrate that free will could be an illusion.
9 Why would you necessarily exclude choices/actions that you probably wouldn't make even though you could if you chose to?
9a Because of the reasons why I didn't make them and the reasons why I made the choices I made. The choices or actions I didn't make are part of my imagination (assuming I thought about them at all). Either way, those actions don't exist (unless we assume they exist in another universe - but that's another topic!)
10 There are many wonderful people--including some one-time suicidal ones--who man telephone hot lines to try to dissuade those who call in who seek help in preventing them from harming themselves. So obviously, people can be dissuaded from suicidal choices.
10a Obviously. And the fact that a suicidal person can be persuaded (psychologically or physically) by a 3rd party to choose to take a different action is an example of an external constraint influencing the choice. The choice was not a result of free will. Sadly, there are times when a suicidal person cannot be dissuaded from killing themselves because their state of mind cannot be altered in time, and so they cannot resist the compulsion to kill themselves. Yet another example which could illustrate that free will is an illusion.
11 Sin is a deliberate choice. In heaven, being in God's presence is so awesome that one would no longer make any other choice. Having been blessed with God's presence they would seek no other option. They have cooperated with God's grace in order to get into heaven.
11a This is an interesting concept which again can be used to illustrate that free will could be an illusion, but also implies the inhabitants of heaven have no free will by definition. The option to sin in heaven, so I'm told, is never put into action. Choices are therefore constrained by God; determined by divine intervention; determined by prior causes and constraints.
11b We can also call this analogy back to the example of (not) dipping one's head in a bucket of acid. If we assume that is a choice which is just as foolish, undesirable and irrational as making the choice to sin in heaven, and we know that no one in their right mind ever dips their head in a bucket of acid, then this supports the free-will-is-an-illusion argument, because there is no choice.
11c We can only speculate about heaven, but the bucket of acid analogy suggests that no one sins in heaven because, just like dipping one's head in a bucket of acid, the inhabitants to heaven can use their imagination (assuming they have a brain) to determine that it would be unimaginably painful, disfiguring, traumatic and possibly fatal. So the apparent choice to sin is actually not a choice - The constraint supports the argument that free will is an illusion.
12 Quantum physics and the uncertainty principle deconstruct rigid determinism. Michio Kaku offers his perspective on the matter on YouTube
12a There are various types of determinism. It's unclear from this question what "rigid" determinism is supposed to mean because Kaku refers to "Newtonian Determinism" which is presumably a type of determinism based on Newtonian mechanics. Also unclear what the word "deconstruct" means in this context.
12b A detailed explanation of the other flaws in Kaku's argument can be found here.
12c Quantum physics may have something to say about how the mind works one day, but probably not in our lifetimes, if at all, as we are only just beginning to scratch the surface of how quantum physics impacts on scales great than the atomic. There's no guarantee that the science of the sub-atomic world applies in the biological world. The leading, and newest, area of current research relevant to free-will is neuroscience and over the last 20 years that has provided objective data supporting very solid arguments that free will is an illusion.
12d And what is the evidence from neuroscience? The physiologist Benjamin Libet used EEG to show that activity in the brain’s motor cortex can be detected some 300 milliseconds before a person feels that he has decided to move. fMRI tests have highlighted two brain regions which contain information about a person's decision 7 to 10 seconds before the decision was consciously made. Direct recordings from the cortex show that the activity of merely 256 neurones was sufficient to predict with 80% accuracy a person’s decision to move nearly one second before he became aware of it. So it seems indisputable that moments before you are aware of what you will do next your brain has already determined what you will do. You then become conscious of this “decision” and believe that you are in the process of making it.
12e Another explanation of the potential illusion of free will is that at the fundamental physical level, the brain's processes rely on quantum-mechanical unpredictability so when we observe it from within, we call it our free will. Actions and decisions result from chemical and biological processes in the brain, before we are conscious of them. We then feel a conviction that our actions are "our own", and that we are responsible for them. This site provides a good summary of the arguments. But to repeat: it is not clear whether it makes sense to apply quantum effects that define particle behaviour to the behaviour of organisms.
12.1 Does the activity in the brain's motor cortex which occurs before the decision to let go, explain why we burn ourselves when we grab something hot?
12.1a No. This is an example of a reflex action. Your hand lets go before you are conscious that you've burned it. The time taken to let go is the time required for the signals to get from your nerve endings in your hand to your brain and then be processed. It's a fraction of a second, which is usually good enough to prevent serious injury, but not enough to prevent a blister.
12.2 There's a time delay in my awareness of what keys I'm punching as I write this - but I am still undertaking the project of writing this through my own free will.
12.2a What you assume is your free will in typing words is an illusion. Your brain determined what you will type and when. You only became consciously aware of that after the decision was made. Sam Harris provides an excellent example of this in the conclusion to his book "Free Will"...
"The problem is not merely that free will makes no sense objectively (i.e., when our thoughts and actions are viewed from a third-person point of view); it makes no sense subjectively either. It is quite possible to notice this through introspection. In fact, I will now perform an experiment in free will for all to see: I will write anything I want for the rest of this book. Whatever I write will, of course, be something I choose to write. No one is compelling me to do this. No one has assigned me a topic or demanded that I use certain words. I can be ungrammatical if I pleased. And if I want to put a rabbit in this sentence, I am free to do so."
"But paying attention to my stream of consciousness reveals that this notion of freedom does not reach very deep. Where did this rabbit come from? Why didn’t I put an elephant in that sentence? I do not know. I am free to change “rabbit” to “elephant,” of course. But if I did this, how could I explain it? It is impossible for me to know the cause of either choice. Either is compatible with my being compelled by the laws of nature or buffeted by the winds of chance; but neither looks, or feels, like freedom. Rabbit or elephant? Am I free to decide that “elephant” is the better word when I just do not feel that it is the better word? Am I free to change my mind? Of course not. It can only change me."
"What brings my deliberations on these matters to a close? This book must end sometime—and now I want to get something to eat. Am I free to resist this feeling? Well, yes, in the sense that no one is going to force me at gunpoint to eat—but I am hungry. Can I resist this feeling a moment longer? Yes, of course—and for an indeterminate number of moments thereafter. But I don’t know why I make the effort in this instance and not in others. And why do my efforts cease precisely when they do? Now I feel that it really is time for me to leave. I’m hungry, yes, but it also seems that I’ve made my point. In fact, I can’t think of anything else to say on the subject. And where is the freedom in that?"
12.3 Decisions are not often instantaneous (certainly not on a scale of a fraction of a second)
12.3a This is true. It depends on the decision. The decision to stop at a red traffic light, or let go of an unexpectedly hot pan handle, happen very, very fast. More complex decisions can take minutes, hours, even days. A life changing decision could take weeks. Or a second. It depends!
12.4 Conscious realization that a decision has been made is delayed from the actual decision, and these are two distinct processes.
12.4 Conscious realization that a decision has been made is delayed from the actual decision, and these are two distinct processes.
12.4a True. The decision is made, then awareness takes place.
12.5 Decision making is not the only mental process going on in such tasks
12.5a Also true. The brain is processing millions of transactions in parallel, all the time,
12.6 Some willed action, as when first learning to play a musical instrument must be freely willed because the subconscious mind cannot know ahead of time what to do.
12.6a This is a circular argument. The concept of a "willed action" is assumed in the premise of the argument, in order to reach the conclusion that the action is freely willed. The decision to play an instrument is not "willed" - it is exactly the same as any other decision.
12.7 Free-will experiments have relied too much on awareness of actions and time estimation of accuracy
12.7a No, the experiments rely on the awareness of the decision, not the subsequent action. (Readiness Potential)
12.8 The timing of when a free-will event occurred requires introspection, and other research shows that introspective estimates of event timing are not accurate
12.8a This argument assumes at the beginning that an event is a "free-will event" without demonstrating that free will exists, so it fails by begging the question. It is also asserts that the timing of a decision requires introspection but this is not true. Awareness of a decision can be measured directly using fMRI, an especially important technique for patients in a vegetative state.
12.9 Simple finger movements may be performed without much conscious thought and are certainly not representative of the conscious decisions and choices required in high-speed conversation or situations where the subconscious mind cannot know ahead of time what to do
12.9a Again the argument presented is begging the question by assuming conscious thought is used to create finger movements and conscious decisions are required in high speed conversations.
12.9b The evidence suggests that simple finger movements - or indeed any decision - are made with no conscious thought. Consciousness provides awareness of the decision to move a finger after the decision is made. Research by John Dylan Haynes confirms this with a more sophisticated experiment.
12.9c A high speed conversation is actually happening at a very slow speed compared to the speed with which the brain processes information but that's not the interesting thing. What is interesting (and it is a long established fact) is that our awareness of the world around us - including people who are conversing with us - is lagging behind real time.
12.9d Different senses arrive in the brain at different times - sound arrives before sight for example, and our brains do not make us aware of what's happening until all the signals are synchronised. Without this mechanism, when we looked at someone's face, their lips would be out of synch with the sound of their voices. So our awareness of a "high speed conversation" is approximately one tenth of a second behind the real time events - our brains are having a conversation and we are aware a short time afterwards. The subconscious mind is always ahead of the conscious mind.
12.9e And it's a good job our subconscious mind is ahead of our conscious mind, otherwise no one would ever be able to hit a ball with a bat or dodge a punch.
12.10 Brain activity measures have been primitive and incomplete.
12.10a They have in the past of course, but fMRI and related technologies are improving exponentially.
12.11 People of all levels of maturity have freedom to consider based on whatever information they are able to muster.
Information is part of it, but the nature of the brain is what determines how that consideration is made. What you call “freedom to consider” is a function of the brain. Your “considerations” are constrained by the nature of your brain. Compare “freedom to consider” of a baby, a teenager, a healthy adult, a brain damaged adult and so on. Consider also the concept of diminished responsibility which is recognised in law.
13 When confronted with choices in a given situation, are we completely helpless to choose because we are forced to respond in a specific way due to our biology or other controlling factors?
13a Yes and no! "No", because we are obviously not "helpless to choose" because we make choices. The question of free will is about how those choices are made. But also "Yes" because that choice is being made by our biology. This is "compatibilism" rather than "determinism".
13.1 My choice of whether to eat a double hot fudge sundae when I am tempted to do so can be expressed as "eat the hot fudge sundae or don't eat the hot fudge sundae." It can also be stated that my choice is to eat the hot fudge sundae and experience an immediate reward, or my choice is to be influenced by the potential to do something unhealthy and choose to do something healthy instead.
13.1a Very true. But that doesn't really get to the point of whether free will is an illusion except to suggest it is an illusion because there is an influence on the choice. Sam Harris uses a similar example in his book "Free Will"...
I generally start each day with a cup of coffee or tea—sometimes two. This morning, it was coffee (two). Why not tea? I am in no position to know. I wanted coffee more than I wanted tea today, and I was free to have what I wanted. Did I consciously choose coffee over tea? No. The choice was made for me by events in my brain that I, as the conscious witness of my thoughts and actions, could not inspect or influence. Could I have “changed my mind” and switched to tea before the coffee drinker in me could get his bearings? Yes, but this impulse would also have been the product of unconscious causes. Why didn’t it arise this morning? Why might it arise in the future? I cannot know. The intention to do one thing and not another does not originate in consciousness—rather, it appears in consciousness, as does any thought or impulse that might oppose it.So it might seem like you exercise free will in overcoming temptations or in overriding self-centered interests, this is not the case. Free will is equally uninvolved when you give into temptations and also when you curb them.
13.2 You claim to be a determinist yet you claim that my choice to have a hot fudge sundae wasn't predetermined after all. How do you reconcile these contradictory positions?
13.2.a First of all, I have never claimed to be a determinist! (see question 21) so there's no contradiction. And we have to be very careful with the word "predetermined". Historically, predetermination was a philosophical position that all events of history, past, present and future, have been already decided or are already known or can be known. I'm certainly not saying that.
13.2.b If someone chooses to eat a hot fudge sundae, it seems the choice is determined by the subconscious mind before the conscious mind is aware of it (see 12d).
13.2.c The hot fudge sundae choice could not have been determined before the subconscious mind made the choice. It could perhaps have been predicted with a certain level of confidence, if we knew a lot about the person in question and their habits. But we could never be 100% certain what choice their subconscious mind would com up with.
13.3 If free will is an illusion, and doesn't exist, then ultimately--no matter how one chooses to disguise it--one argues on behalf of determinism. It's an "either/or" issue.
13.3a If only it was that simple! The taxonomy of determinism is far from simple as shown here Also note that "not exist" and "illusion" are not the same thing. For example, a rainbow exists, but it is an illusion.
13.4 If free will is an illusion, does that mean no control or responsibility, so that we are all "victims of circumstance" without ultimate control of our thoughts, choices and actions?
13.4a No. Our brains control our thoughts, choices an actions, and healthy brains are extremely good at doing so, having evolved over billions of years. We cannot dodge responsibility for our actions by saying "it wasn't me - it was my brain that made me do it!" because my brain is me. One of the benefits of society is that everyone's communicated ideas and actions influence everyone else's thoughts and hence their decisions and actions. You could say we are the result of circumstances - but "victim" is not an appropriate word. A victim suffers, and if we experience or witness suffering, that's a problem our brains will attempt to resolve.
14 How can we ever experience matters like love and gratitude and appreciation without free will?
14a These things are experienced all the time, automatically, because they are based on emotional responses, and so they can be used to illustrate that free will is an illusion. Most human beings can't help having those feelings. A minority are unable to experience those feelings. Either way, free will is not the reason. A person could choose to act as if they loved someone, and they would have reasons for doing so, but that is not love.
15 Does this mean "Love" is merely a chemical response without meaning because all that we might do in the name of love and all that might appear as caring for another are predetermined?
15a Yes, in that love, like all emotions, is a chemical response, but obviously it's not that simple - emotions are an extremely complex combination of chemical and biological processes which have evolved over many millions of years in millions of species. So we must not use the word "merely"!
But also "no" because there is nothing "predetermined" about our emotional responses. All that we do in the name of love (or any emotion) is a result of being human and being alive, and it's a wonderful thing.
16 If all we do is receive, how can we learn to give--or the meaningfulness of giving?
16a The question is self-refuting. If all we do is receive then no one is giving so no one would be able to receive. With respect to free-will, the reason humans display giving or generosity or altruism is because it makes us feel good to do so. This can also be argued to be an example of the illusion of free will. Most people are "automatically" giving, and if that was not a human trait, we would have been extinct a long time ago!
17 If our actions are pre-determined, are we nothing more than automatons?
17a I'm not sure if that would make us automatons, but in any case, I don't think actions are predetermined (depending on what pre-determined means in this context). Our actions are determined by our brains. Or as Daniel Dennett puts it... "The critics of Darwinism just don't want to confront the fact that molecules, enzymes and proteins lead to thought. Yes, we have a soul, but it's made up of lots of tiny robots."
17b Experiments show that what we assume to be conscious decisions are actually an afterthought and the decisions come from the subconscious. But that doesn't mean our brain processes are something other than "ourselves". We can accept that our free will is an illusion, but it's wrong to assume that makes us automatons. We can accept that the brain makes voluntary decisions, but the decision-making occurs unconsciously by brain processes which are not our conscious selves.
18 If we only do "good" because it "feels good", then would we no longer do good if it didn't feel good? If so, how do we explain love, giving, and self-sacrifice?
17a We would indeed stop doing good if it didn't feel good and/or if there were no benefits. But it does feel good, and there are benefits, so it's a hypothetical situation that doesn't arise in practice. The only exception is for people who have no natural empathy towards other people, so maybe religion has played a useful psychological role here by providing supernatural incentives to be good for those people with no facility for empathy.
19 God calls us only to do good and we are inspired to love God and do good because God has demonstrated His love and caring for us
19a The God argument is a supernatural explanation for why people do good things, and doesn't explain how free will may or may not work. If it is being argued that it is belief in God which causes people to be giving and good, then that supports the argument that free will is an illusion, according to the definitions of free will (see introduction). Obviously religion can influence people to do good things (The Father Christmas principle) but of course it can also influence people to do bad things. It all depends on the motives of the people who are doing the influencing and the credulity of their audience.
20.1 Your free will argument is as fallacious as saying atheism is all about not believing in gods. A "non-choice" is in fact a "positive" choice to do something else in its stead.
20.1a It is not fallacious to say that atheism is all about not believing in gods, because that is the definition of atheism. But the analogy of free will with belief is somewhat pointless as belief (or lack of) is not a choice.
20.2 Is there a contradiction with people who refer to themselves as "free thinkers claiming that free will is an illusion and it's not really them who is doing their thinking?
20.2a There are two false assumptions in that question: The meaning of "free thinker" and the "who" that is thinking. "Free thought" and "free will" are separate concepts.
20.2.b The concept of "free thought" arose in the 17th century as a philosophy which determines truth from logic, reason, and empiricism, rather than authority, tradition, or other dogmas. It was originally applied to people who challenged the basis of traditional religious beliefs. Free thought aims to minimise the effects of confirmation bias, cognitive bias, conventional wisdom, popular culture, prejudice, or sectarianism.
20.2.c If someone is a "free thinker" then we can assume their brain analyses problems and makes decisions according to the principles of free thought. So how did they become a free thinker? In exactly the same was as any person arrives at any way of thinking, and that is a combination of nature and nurture.
20.2.d So who is doing their thinking? It's not a "who" - it's the brain. Obviously, a "free thinker" - just like anyone else - has a brain that is doing their thinking.
21 You appear to be a rigid determinist where every single action has been accounted for due to factors beyond our understanding but which nonetheless absolutely constrain future actions.
21a I don't consider myself to be a determinist (and certainly not a "rigid" one!) - "compatibilist" is maybe a better word, but maybe not! The types and subtypes of determinism is far from clear as shown here. The universe seems probabilistic to me, rather than deterministic so U suppose I'm a probabilist? For example, if we were to rewind the universe back to the Big Bang and restart the process, I don't think the universe would be the same as it is now. Similar, but not the same. I think it's impossible for future actions to be determined absolutely, and the further into the future we go, the lower the probability of determining what might happen. The weather illustrates that we can make fairly good predictions especially in the short-term, but beyond that it's unpredictable. Perhaps this illustrates that our climate has free will, but I don't think so!
22 What about our ability to override strong influences on our actions from the more primitive centers in our brains through exercising our frontal lobes?
22a The question answers itself - if one part of the brain "overrides" another part of the brain, then it is the brain that is making the decisions and again this suggests that free will could be an illusion. And indeed the brain does seem to have "dual processes"...
Recent advances in experimental psychology and neuroimaging have allowed us to study the boundary between conscious and unconscious mental processes with increasing precision. We now know that at least two systems in the brain—often referred to as “dual processes”—govern human cognition, emotion, and behavior. One is evolutionarily older, unconscious, slow to learn, and quick to respond; the other evolved more recently and is conscious, quick to learn, and slow to respond. The phenomenon of priming, in which subliminally presented stimuli influence a person’s thoughts and emotions, exposes the first of these systems and reveals the reality of complex mental processes at work beneath the level of conscious awareness. People can be primed in a wide variety of ways, and these unconscious influences reliably alter their goals and subsequent behaviour.
- H. Aarts, R. Custers, & H. Marien, 2008. Preparing and motivating behavior outside of awareness. Science 319[5780]: 1639
- R. Custers & H. Aarts, 2010. The unconscious will: How the pursuit of goals operates outside of conscious awareness. Science 329 [5987]: 47–50).
23.1 If you are a determinist then you are doomed to nihilism
23.1a I'm not a determinist, but in any case, I don't see why hard determinism should necessarily lead to nihilism. Hard determinism simply rejects Cartesian duality - the division of self/mind. If we give up the idea of duality and the belief in free will, it might make no difference or it might provide benefits. It is a fact that the “you” that says that you consciously chose your actions can be unreliable. It's a fact that some people "tell themselves" that they are ugly, fat, incompetent, failures, etc.
23.1b Knowing that free will is an illusion leads to an updated version of "the self" which some now call “third wave psychotherapies” such as acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT), mindfulness, metacognitive therapy and so on. These approaches teach us to be cautious about what our “minds” tell us and encourage us to instead observe our conscious thoughts non-judgmentally, to call them into question or even let go. ACT asks... “If I’m not my thoughts, what am I?” So in order to understand the true nature of the "self", we may have to abandon some of our old philosophies such as free will and duality in favour of an approach based on what's actually observed in neuroscience. This could lead to a step change in self-awareness, and more benefits to mental health.
23.2 Denying free will leads to the dehumanisation of us all, according to Bryan Caplan's essay
23.2.a Caplan's ideas on libertarianism and economics are worth reading, but his essay on free will is a bit lame.
23.3 If a person believes that free will is an illusion, then one absolves oneself from all responsibility for one's decisions.
This is a key argument by those who argue for free will, especially from a religious
perspective. It is obviously untrue - one cannot help feeling responsibility.
24 Evolution by natural selection eliminates traits that are useless. But "free will" is a trait that is beneficial.
24a If free will is an illusion then free will not a "trait". One of our main evolutionary advantages is our intelligence which emerges from our brain - it enables us to solve complex problems, consider "what-if" scenarios, imagine, share knowledge, use language and so on. So free will is not a trait but the illusion of free will can be considered a trait and it would be a trait that gives us an evolutionary advantage, mainly because of the importance of self-deception. The evolution of intelligence is discussed here.
24b If my brain makes me feel that I’m a nice person, then I’m going to be much better at making other people think the same thing (even if I'm not a nice person!) and that gives me an advantage. I am nice because in the long term it suits me to be nice. If I become convinced that I truly am nice, then I will not yield to the temptation to be nasty for short-term advantage. I will be consistently nice, and the benefits of niceness are far greater if one acts nicely. The illusion of free will makes me feel that I am deciding to be nice, and if I am deciding to be nice, having the option of being nasty, then I must be a truly nice person!
25.1 When I make a decision or offer an opinion, am I doing it or is it merely a function of my brain?
25.1a This question gets right to the heart of the issue as outlined in the introduction - what do we mean by "I"? Those who advocate free will seem to be assuming that there is an agent, independent of the brain, which represents the person somehow, and which can consider what the brain has decided as if separate from the brain, and overrule the brain. I say the existence of that independent agent is an illusion.
25.1b So to answer the question, when you make a decision or offer an opinion, it is a function of your brain, because your brain is you. "I" and my brain are the same thing.
25.2 Explain "function of your brain"
25.2a When I say "function of your brain" I mean the processes in the brain which receive information as inputs, and produce information as outputs. The outputs are thoughts (ideas, decisions) and actions. The processes are "thinking", and the output thoughts can also act as inputs especially for solving difficult problems that can cycle through the thinking processes for hours or days, or even weeks, even when we are asleep or conscious of other things.
25.1a This question gets right to the heart of the issue as outlined in the introduction - what do we mean by "I"? Those who advocate free will seem to be assuming that there is an agent, independent of the brain, which represents the person somehow, and which can consider what the brain has decided as if separate from the brain, and overrule the brain. I say the existence of that independent agent is an illusion.
25.1b So to answer the question, when you make a decision or offer an opinion, it is a function of your brain, because your brain is you. "I" and my brain are the same thing.
25.2 Explain "function of your brain"
25.2a When I say "function of your brain" I mean the processes in the brain which receive information as inputs, and produce information as outputs. The outputs are thoughts (ideas, decisions) and actions. The processes are "thinking", and the output thoughts can also act as inputs especially for solving difficult problems that can cycle through the thinking processes for hours or days, or even weeks, even when we are asleep or conscious of other things.
25.3a Not quite. If we need to make a moral decision, then our brain perceives that need as a problem to be solved and so it begins to solve the problem. Sometimes the solution will be arrived at very quickly, sometimes it could take hours, days or even weeks.
25.4 If our free will is an illusion, what's to say that "my" thinking and understanding of a particular thing isn't an illusion either? Why should I trust what I think?
25.4a When we observe people who are deluded or people who deceive themselves, or people with false memories, it becomes obvious that we can't really trust our brains because delusional people usually don't know they are deluded. One way to increase the trust in your own brain is to constantly test your ideas to demonstrate to yourself that what you believe is not a delusion, and also asking other people what they think about what you think. However, this obviously isn't a perfect method. Some people seem less susceptible to delusion than others, and there is recent evidence that irregularities in the right hemisphere combined with hyperactivity in the left hemisphere are the cause. If we realise that our brains can't be trusted, it can lead us to a more rational outlook on life, but that can be a bad thing. Delusions can bring comfort and certainty in an uncertain universe, and can provide self-confidence. So the trustworthiness of our brains it's not something to worry about, unless the delusions lead to dangerous behaviour.
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Free will and moral responsibility.
