Wednesday 18 September 2013

Argument from Efficient Causality - Refuted

These are some standard objections to argument #2 on the list provided here...

The key points of the argument are:

- All things, including all those things which are causing things to be, need a cause. They can give being only so long as they are given being. Nothing can cause itself to exist.

- There could not exist an endless series of causes stretching backward into the past. 

- Things have got to exist in order to be mutually dependent; they cannot depend upon each other for their entire being, for then they would have to be, simultaneously, cause and effect of each other.

- If this thing can exist only because something else is giving it existence, then there must exist something whose being is not a gift. Otherwise everything would need at the same time to be given being, but nothing (in addition to "everything") could exist to give it. And that means nothing would actually be.

- So there must be something uncaused, something on which all things that need an efficient cause of being are dependent, which is a first cause, and this is God.

Perhaps the most well known summary objection is...

"If everything must have a cause, then God must have a cause. If there can be anything without a cause, it may just as well be the world as God, so that there cannot be any validity in that argument. It is exactly of the same nature as the Hindu's view, that the world rested upon an elephant and the elephant rested upon a tortoise; and when they said, "How about the tortoise?" the Indian said, "Suppose we change the subject." The argument is really no better than that. There is no reason why the world could not have come into being without a cause; nor, on the other hand, is there any reason why it should not have always existed. There is no reason to suppose that the world had a beginning at all. The idea that things must have a beginning is really due to the poverty of our imagination. Therefore, perhaps, I need not waste any more time upon the argument about the First Cause."

From "Why I am not a Christian" by Bertrand Russell - 1927



Some of the standard objections:

- There is a contradiction between the conclusion (God) and the first premise. If God is "something", then the argument logically allows the question "what caused God?". If God is not something, then there is no God. But if the argument is exempting God to avoid these questions, then we have a circular argument.

- There is an assumption that a sequence of causes is temporal. Quantum physics provides evidence that there are many different mechanisms for the relation of events, and this includes events with no cause, simultaneous causation, backward causation and so on.

- The argument assumes with no justification that an infinite regress of causes is a less reasonable explanation than an infinite, all powerful God who created the imperfect world that we see. If God is a perfect cause, the effects of that cause must be perfect. 

- Even if there were a first cause, it does not follow that this first cause is God. There could be many gods as first causes. Or we could assume the first cause was a singularity or a quantum vacuum fluctuation or an unknown thing yet to be discovered. Perhaps the universe of causes circles back on itself so that there is no first cause, but every effect still has a cause.


- The argument assumes causality occurs everywhere within the universe but this assumption is based on empirical evidence from the limited experience of the author of the argument (Thomas Aquinas) who lived 800 years ago.

Further reading...
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aquinas/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-metaphysics/
Dictionary of the History of Ideas - "Causation in the 17th Century"





Saturday 14 September 2013

An Analysis of Peter Kreeft's 20 Arguments for the Existence of God

Peter Kreeft is a professor of philosophy and  the author of numerous books on Christian Apologetics including "The Handbook of Christian Apologetics". This collates a list of twenty arguments for God which have been made over the centuries. You can view them here

Each of them has well known philosophical objections - these are provided below:


#1 The Argument from Change
#2 The Argument from Efficient Causality
#3 The Argument from Time and Contingency
#4 The argument from Degrees of Perfection
#5 The Design Argument
#6 The Kalam Argument
#7 The Argument from Contingency
#8 The Argument from the world as an interacting whole
#9 The Argument from Miracles 
#10 The Argument from Consciousness
#11 The Argument from Truth
#12 The Argument from the origin of the idea of God
#13 The Ontological Argument
#14 The Moral Argument
#15 The Argument from Conscience
#16 The Argument from Desire
#17 The Argument from aesthetic experience
#18 The Argument from Religious Experience
#19 The Common Consent Argument
#20 Pascal's Wager

Argument from Change - Refuted

These are the standard objections to argument #1 on the list provided here...

The first flaw in this argument is encapsulated in the assertion that “Nothing changes itself”.

For a start, this in itself is a hypothesis rather than a statement of fact. It could be said that "things are observed to change." That is a fact. But beginning an inductive argument with a hypothesis is back to front. The inductive argument should lead to a hypothesis.

Another flaw in the initial assumption is that the use of the word "itself".  This implies that things that change have a "self". What the author is perhaps trying to say is that nothing changes without a cause and one has to wonder why he avoided expressing it that way.  The fact is we see things changing all the time for purely natural reasons.  

He then goes on to say things that change need something outside themselves to change. This is factually incorrect, for example, the decay of radioactive atoms which "change themselves".  So essentially Kreeft is making the assumption that there is some agent of change "outside" our universe in order to prove that there is something outside our universe. It's a circular argument.

The second flaw is that even if we accept the concept of a “first mover” there is nothing that indicates this "first mover" created our universe. It is entirely possible that beings with less power than a god could create a universe.   Or it could have been a natural event, and there are several hypotheses in cosmology which explain this. To then go further and give the "first mover" the label of "God" is the same as giving God the label of "first mover". Circular again.

The final flaw is the concept of a having an arbitrary termination to an infinite regression where that termination is God. This unjustified assumption is used in many similar arguments (most of which come from Aristotle via Thomas Aquinas). So apologists arbitrarliy terminate this regression and give it the label “God”. They then arbitrarily assign attributes to this terminated regression such as omnipotence, omniscience, goodness, creativity of design, listening to prayers, forgiving sins and so on. To quote Richard Dawkins...

To return to the infinite regress and the futility of invoking God to terminate it, it is more parsimonious to conjure up, say, a ‘big bang singularity’, or some other physical concept as yet unknown. Calling it God is at best unhelpful and at worst perniciously misleading.

Edward Lear’s Nonsense Recipe for Crumboblious Cutlets invites us to ‘Procure some strips of beef, and having cut them into the smallest possible pieces, proceed to cut them still smaller, eight or perhaps nine times.’” 

Some regresses do reach a natural terminator. Scientists used to wonder what would happen if you could dissect, say, gold into the smallest possible pieces. Why shouldn’t you cut one of those pieces in half and produce an even smaller smidgen of gold? The regress in this case is decisively terminated by the atom. The smallest possible piece of gold is a nucleus consisting of exactly seventy-nine protons and a slightly larger number of neutrons, attended by a swarm of seventy-nine electrons. If you ‘cut’ gold any further than the level of the single atom, whatever else you get is not gold. The atom provides a natural terminator to the Crumboblious Cutlets type of regress. It is by no means clear that God provides a natural terminator to the regress of Aquinas.

SUMMARY

1a) The premise that “nothing changes itself” is incorrect because some things are observed to change themselves. And even if such things were not observed, we can't assume that such things do not exist somewhere in our universe just because we haven't observed them.

1b) The premise that “A change in any being requires an outside force to actualize it.” has been assumed with no justification. Also, the argument is restricted to “beings” rather than nature as a whole.

1c) The premise of “a force outside the universe” is immediately restated as “a being outside the universe” with no justification, thereby introducing the premise of a transcendent being in order to demonstrate the existence of a transcendent being. This is circular reasoning.

1d) We are asked to assume that God is exempt from the premise that “nothing changes itself”. This is a fallacious argument (special pleading).

1e) If we withdraw the special pleading argument, we are left with a contradiction in the assumption that “God is the unchanging Source of change.” If God is unchanging then God can't do anything. God is already everything that God could ever be. In which case, there's no potential (and there will never have been any potential) for God to be able to act or be in any way different from what God is now or was in the past.

1f) Even if we assume an infinite regression of change, the termination of this regression with a transcendent being known as "God" is arbitrary. Not only is the termination itself arbitrary, but so is the "thing" placed at that termination point. It would be just as valid to terminate the infinite regression with a ‘big bang singularity’, or a 'quantum vacuum fluctuation' or 'something as yet unknown' or even the Flying Spaghetti Monster!

For more information regarding the standard objections to the arguments put forward by Thomas Aquinas, refer to...

http://philosophy.lander.edu/intro/motion.shtml
http://philosophy.lander.edu/intro/cause.shtml